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Abstract
We consider a firm A initially owning a software platform (e.g.
operating system) and an application for this platform. The specific
knowledge of another firm B is needed to make the platform successful
by creating a further application. When B’s application is completed,
A has incentives to expropriate the rents. Netscape claimed e.g. that
this was the case with its browser running on MS Windows. We will
argue that open sourcing or standardizing the platform is a warranty
for B against expropriation of rents. The different pieces of software are
considered as assets in the sense of the property rights literature (see
Hart and Moore (Journal of Political Economy, 1990)). Two cases of
joint ownership are considered beyond the standard cases of integration
and non-integration: platform standardization (both parties can veto
changes) and open source (no veto rights). In line with the literature,
the more important a party’s specific investments the more rights it
should have. In contrast to Hart and Moore, however, joint ownership
can be optimal in our setting. Open source is optimal if investments in
the applications are more important than in the platform. The results
are driven by the fact that in our model firms invest in physical (and
not in human) capital and that there is non-rivalry in consumption for
software.
Keywords: Platforms, open source, standardization, incomplete con-
tracts, property rights, joint ownership
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1 INTRODUCTION 2
“... If you look at history ... rumor has it that IBM spent a billion dol-
lars on applications for [their operating system] OS2 but they bought
people, they said ‘here, do this for me.’ And at the end, the companies
turned around and said ‘here, it’s done’ – and IBM said ‘well, aren’t
you going to sell it, market it?’ They said ‘well no, our deal was to
develop it: you’ve got it, now good luck.’”1
1 Introduction
Complementary products are crucial for the success of platforms in the IT
industry.2 Firms developing platforms typically provide some of the com-
plementary products themselves or pay other firms to do so. However, as
the quote at the beginning exemplifies, this is often not enough. Employees
or firms that are simply paid to finish a product (e.g. a piece of software or
a hardware peripheral3) do not have the same incentive to work hard for the
success of the product as an owner of the product would. This is especially
true for the IT industry where the complexity of the products and the unpre-
dictability of the development processes make complete contingent contracts
impossible. Therefore, the platform owner needs independent firms to create
a complementary product.4 But this raises problems of its own. After the
independent firm has created the product and made the platform successful,
the platform owner has the stronger position and ex post every incentive to
expropriate the rents. An independent firm anticipating this may not be
1Claude Leglise, director of Intel Developer Relations Group, explaining why Intel
wants independent firms to invest in products complementary to the Intel platform by
themselves. Quote taken from Gawer and Henderson (2007, p. 20).
2The most prominent example of a platform is Microsoft Windows. We use platform in
a similar sense as e.g. West (2003): standardized products that “allow modular substitu-
tion of complementary assets such as software and peripheral hardware”. Corresponding
examples of complementary products would be Microsoft Excel and Lotus 1-2-3 for Win-
dows.
3A peripheral is a device attached to a computer such as a mouse or a printer.
4An economic explanation of why a platform owner wants other firms to enter its
market and examples where this observation applies are given in Niedermayer (2006).
Similar results are obtained in Economides (1996) for industries with network effects.
Note that non-contractable effort level is not explicitly modeled in both papers, it is
assumed that one cannot hire an employee to do the job.
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willing to create the product ex ante.5
We will argue here that the different licensing schemes of platforms6 and
the different ownership structures7 observed in the industry are commitment
devices to reduce the inefficiencies created by this hold-up problem and to
improve incentives to invest in innovation.
Many of the phenomena can be explained by the incomplete contracts
and property rights literature à la Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and
Moore (1990). If a firm’s specific investment is more important, it should
be assigned stronger property rights ex ante to have a stronger bargaining
position ex post and hence higher investment incentives. However, some
of the observations cannot be explained by the standard Hart and Moore
framework. In the standard framework joint ownership and ownership by
none can never be optimal.8 We will argue that a standardized platform is
analogous to joint ownership (all parties in the standardization committee
have veto powers9) and that open source is analogous to ownership by none
(no one has veto power). A further point where our analysis departs from
the standard framework is the consideration of the asset creation phase. It
is a recurring pattern that a start-up develops a first version or prototype
of a product (e.g. piece of software) and then it is bought up by a large
platform firm.
We explain these observed ownership structures with a model extending
the Hart and Moore (1990) property rights framework. Hart and Moore
have two managers of two firms (in our case one should rather think of
5This has also been called the “tension between appropriation and adoption” in the
empirical literature on platforms, see e.g. West (2003).
6Proprietary, standardized, and open source; to be specified in detail later.
7Vertical integration, independent firms, initially independent startups being bought
up later.
8Note that we consider property rights as rights to veto the usage of an asset similarly
to Hart and Moore.
9Of course this is a strong simplification as other decision rules than unanimous vote
can be agreed on for a committee. However, decisions made by a committee are in any
case more complicated than those by a single party.
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two software developers), say A and B.10 At stage 1 ownership rights are
decided on, then developers make specific sunk non-verifiable investments,
and at stage 2 A and B renegotiate the distribution of profits. We introduce
a further stage 0. At stage 0 A owns a monopoly platform and a comple-
mentary asset. We will refer to complementary assets as “applications” from
now on.11 Software developer A first decides whether the platform should
be proprietary, standardized, or open source, which will have an impact on
bargaining power later. B considers developing a first version or prototype
of a new application. B can further decide whether he12 wants to do this as
an independent developer or whether he wants to negotiate with A about
being hired. Stages 1 and 2 follow Hart and Moore (1990). At stage 1, if
B is independent, A and B decide whether B should be acquired by A or
stay independent.13 After deciding on ownership structure, A and B make
non-verifiable investments in the further development of the platform and
the applications.14 At stage 2 A and B renegotiate their contracts. Because
we assume physical capital, an acquirer can make full use of the asset no
matter whether the acquired agrees or not, and can therefore expropriate
the whole rent.15 If A’s platform is proprietary and B is independent, A
can threaten B to use her strong position to reduce B’s application prof-
its. Such an action has been referred to as an “ex post squeeze” of B’s
10In the tradition of Hart and Moore (1990) we will abstract from many real world
aspects of the relation of two firms. One abstraction is that there is only one manager
in each firm – or that the management of a firm makes joint decisions that maximize the
joint utility of this firm’s management.
11This is for the sake of simplicity. Our model applies to more general complementary
assets than just software applications. Such assets can also be a factory to create hardware
or skills to provide consulting and support services complementary to the platform.
12In the following we will refer to A as “she” and to B as “he”.
13We assume that A’s specific investments are so important that it can never be efficient
for B to acquire A.
14Imagine e.g. Internet compatibility coming up as a new requirement by users.
15Assuming physical capital strongly simplifies our analysis. However, similar results
are likely to hold for human capital.
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profits.16,17 Microsoft was e.g. accused of not revealing parts of its new
application programming interfaces (APIs) to competitors in the anti-trust
case. If the platform is standardized18 both A and B can threaten to veto
mutually beneficial changes to the platform. If the platform is open source,
no one has a threat. Stronger property rights result in a better bargaining
position at renegotiations. The main statement of the model is that the
more important B’s specific investment the stronger his bargaining position
should be. Bargaining power is the lowest if B has been acquired, higher if
he is an independent developer for a proprietary platform, again higher for a
standardized platform, and highest for an open source platform. In contrast
to this, if the development of the platform or A’s application is important,
she should be given stronger bargaining power. We also get the following
result. Assume specific investment in the first version of B’s application (as-
set creation) is important, the further development, however, is not. Then
it is optimal that B develops a first version as an independent firm and is
acquired by A afterwards.
Related Literature. This paper is clearly related to the property rights
and incomplete contracts literature (as in Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart
and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995)). We have outlined above where we
16Gawer and Henderson (2007) describe in their case study that Intel managers consid-
ered it as crucial for the success of the Intel platform to “signal that [Intel] expects both
Intel and its competitors to make money in complementary markets – that it will not ’suck
all the air’ out of them” (p. 3). “Squeezing” could be either decreasing the price in the
application market (and thus increasing profits in the platform market) or “manipulating
the boundary between the market and the core of the platform to advantage Intel-owned
products” (p. 17). We will rather focus on the latter as this is more likely for the examples
we have in mind: Apple, IBM, Sun (see West (2003)), and Microsoft.
17Farrell and Katz (2000) consider different ways of reducing a complementor’s profits
that they label price squeeze, investment squeeze, exclusionary squeeze, and extraction
of side-payments (or access charges) by threat of a squeeze. As the exact way how the
complementor’s profits are reduced does not matter for our analysis, we refer the reader
to Farrell and Katz (2000) for a detailed description.
18Examples include the Open Software Foundation and the X/Open consortium for the
standardization of Unix operating system (see e.g. West (2003)) and the Java Community
Process Executive Committee deciding about changes of the Java platform.
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have departed from the standard framework. The main difference in results
is that joint ownership and ownership by none can be optimal in our setup.
Rosenkranz and Schmitz (1999) show that joint asset ownership with veto
power can be optimal if know-how disclosure by both parties is necessary.
One of the examples of ex post squeezing – not revealing the APIs – could
be interpreted as non-disclosure of know-how. However, in our set-up there
are three assets and only one party invests in platform development and can
hence disclose its know-how.
Besides the incomplete contracts literature, this paper is also related to
the growing literature on open source software, as surveyed and extended in
Lerner and Tirole (2005) and Maurer and Scotchmer (2006). Our model has
similarities with Bessen’s (2005) who also considers open source software de-
velopment in the context of incomplete contracts. However, the focus is on
the complexity of the software and not on the ownership of the platform19
and the applications running on it. Here we assume that the application
sold by the platform owner is proprietary and only the platform is possibly
open source. Polanski (2007, forthcoming) compares investment incentives
in open source and proprietary projects in a framework of sequential bar-
gaining whereas our focus is on the optimal allocation of property rights.
Economides and Katsamakas (2006) look at open source programmers that
maximize consumer surplus and their reputation and compare their invest-
ment incentives with those of developers of proprietary software.
Our paper also relates to the literature on complementary products.
Farrell and Katz (2000) focus on the hold-up problem arising when a mo-
nopolist has an incentive to squeeze prices in a complementary market after
the complementors made their investments.20 Our focus is on how firms
try to solve similar hold-up problems. The growing empirical literature on
19There is of course a connection between the two topics. Complexity is responsible
for the fact that a platform cannot incorporate all the features required by users and,
therefore, third-party applications running on it are necessary.
20See footnote 17 for other ways of reducing complementors’ profits.
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markets with complementary products supports our theoretical arguments
in this paper. West (2003) contains case studies of three firms (IBM, Apple,
Sun Microsystems) producing platforms and complementary products and
describes their strategies to solve the hold-up problem21 by open sourcing or
standardizing their platforms. Gawer and Henderson (2007) describe Intel’s
strategy of encouraging entry to their platforms by credibly committing not
to squeeze them ex post. They find that Intel’s commitment devices are
its internal organizational structure,22 lowering the costs of entry largely by
dissemination of intellectual property, and stability of subsidies to comple-
mentors. Boudreau’s (2006) qualitative and quantitative analysis of mobile
computing platforms23 comes to empirical results that fit our theoretical
predictions very well. Boudreau’s main findings are that (1) platform sup-
pliers change the boundaries of their platform24 in order to induce entry by
application developers and to give them investment incentives and that (2)
a more open platform leads to higher investment in applications but lower
investment in the platform itself.25
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic setup.
Section 3 describes ownership structures that can be agreed on at stage 1.
Section 4 describes firms’ investment choices between stages 1 and 2 and the
properties of different ownership structures at stage 1. Section 5 describes
stage 0 of the model when assets are created. Section 6 discusses the results
21Which West calls the “tension between appropriability and adoption”.
22Intel clearly states that it distinguishes between units pursuing “Job 1”, expanding
demand for its microprocessor, and units pursuing “Job 2”, making profits with markets
complementary to its platform. It is also notable that Intel founded a stand alone, not-
for-profit unit – the Intel Architectural Labs – which is responsible for the development
of intellectual property benefiting the Intel platform and its complementors (Gawer and
Henderson 2007, p.18).
23This includes handheld computers such as the Palm Pilot and smartphones that are
able to access the Internet and load application software.
24Expanding the boundary of the platform is similar to hiring or acquiring an application
developer in our model.
25Boudreau’s results can be understood this way if one interprets “low coordination
investment” (Boudreau 2006, p.90) as investment in applications and “high coordination
investment” (p.92) as investment in the platform.
2 BASIC SETUP 8
and Section 7 concludes.
2 Basic Setup
Our model is based on Hart (1995) and Hart and Moore (1990) where two
managers of two firms (or software developers) owning two assets decide on
asset ownership rights at stage 1, then make relation specific investments,
and finally renegotiate their contract at stage 2. Here we deviate from Hart
and Moore (1990) in three main points. First, we have a stage 0 when
commitment to a software development model (open-source, standardized,
non-standardized) is made and an asset is created. Second, there are three
rather than two assets: besides the two applications (representing the as-
sets of the two firms) there is also a platform whose development benefits
both applications. Third, investment is in physical rather than human cap-
ital. This means that the owner of an asset can fully expropriate its rents
and a non-owner has no interest in making any specific investments in the
development of this asset.
The three assets are applications a and b, and a platform p as depicted
in Figure 1. The two firms in the market are A’s and B’s firms. At stage 0 A
has already developed application a and platform p, B considers developing
application b. At stage 1, A and B decide on ownership structure of the
assets and then on how much to invest in software development. At stage
2 there are renegotiations and demand and profits are realized. First, we
will describe stages 1 and 2. It will be assumed that B did develop the
application. Then we consider how expectations of what happens at stages
1 and 2 influence both developers’ decisions at stage 0: A can choose a
development model for her platform, B may or may not enter the market.
Figure 2 depicts the timing.
Ownership rights mean in our setting that one has a residual veto power.
The exact meaning of veto power will be specified later. In the following
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Consumers
Platform p
Applications a b
Figure 1: Applications a and b; platform p. a and p are initially owned by
firm A, b is initially owned by firm B. Firm B may or may not enter the
market.
Figure 2: Timing of the model
“X = {y, z}” will mean “developer X has veto power over assets y and z”.
Following four types of ownership structure are possible at stage 1.
• Acquisition: A acquires B26 and owns both applications and the plat-
form (Q := (A = {a, b, p},B = ∅))
• Proprietary Platform with Independent Application Developer: A owns
the platform and application a, B owns application b (P := (A =
{a, p},B = {b}))
• Standardized Platform with Independent Application Developer: A
26For the sake of simplicity we will say “A acquires B” throughout the paper. To be
precise it should of course read “A’s firm acquires B’s firm”.
2 BASIC SETUP 10
owns application a, B owns application b, joint ownership of platform,
both firms have veto rights (S := (A = {a, p},B = {b, p}))
• Open Source Platform with Independent Application Developer: A
owns application a, B owns application b, joint ownership of platform,
none has veto power over platform (O := (A = {a},B = {b}))
There are further possibilities of ownership structure which will not be con-
sidered here.27
Between stages 1 and 2 A and B invest in the development of the ap-
plications and the platform. An application benefits from an improvement
of the platform. At stage 2 firms renegotiate contracts. If they reach an
agreement, changes to the platform are implemented and both firms ben-
efit from the improvement. If negotiations break down, the owner of the
platform can reduce the revenues of the application b, by using an “ex post
squeeze” as described in Farrell and Katz (2000) or by denying access to the
new Application Programming Interface (API) of the platform.28 In case of
a standardized platform changes to the platform can be blocked and both
firms benefit less from improvements.29
Revenues generated by the applications are determined by investments
in the development of the platform p and applications a and b, denoted
as π, α, β ∈ R+0 , respectively. We will assume that developers make
non-verifiable investments in physical capital which can thus be fully ex-
propriated by the asset owner.30 A has the specific knowledge to make
27E.g. B may acquire A or one might give ownership of the platform to an independent
firm. We will assume that the specific investment of A in her application and the platform
are so important that these ownership structures can never be optimal and hence need
not be considered. Note further that whether the platform is proprietary, standardized,
or open source only matters when there is an independent developer for this platform.
28An API is the interface through which an application developer accesses the platform.
Having access to the old API only gives an application developer a competitive advantage.
29Integrating modules for a simplified access to the Internet into the platform may be
a feature desired by consumers. If such features are not incorporated, demand for the
platform and hence both applications may decrease.
30Physical capital implies hence that the investor does not gain bargaining power by
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investments α and π, B has the specific knowledge for investment β. The
only purpose of the platform is to increase applications’ revenues, it does
not create revenues itself.31 We further assume that both applications’
revenues depend on the investment in the platform. We will denote rev-
enues created by applications a and b in case of an agreement as Ra(α, π)
and Rb(β, π). To simplify notation we will write first and second deriva-
tives as Rkl(k
′, π) := ∂Rk(k
′, π)/∂l and Rklm(k
′, π) := ∂Rk(k
′, π)/∂m∂l for
(k, k′) ∈ {(a, α), (b, β)} and l,m ∈ {k′, π}. We assume revenue functions to
be twice differentiable, increasing (Raα > 0, Raπ > 0, Rbβ > 0, Rbπ > 0)
and concave (Raαα < 0, Raππ < 0, Rbββ < 0, Rbππ < 0) in investments. Fur-
ther, we assume that an investment does not affect an other investment’s
marginal revenue (Raαπ = Rbβπ = 0).
32 Because cross-derivatives are zero
we will drop the unnecessary variable when writing the first derivative, e.g.
Raπ(π) := Raπ(α, π).
In case of a break down of negotiations generated revenues are r
(A,B)
a (α, π)
and r
(A,B)
b (β, π), where (A,B) describes the ownership structure in the in-
dustry. The same notation for the derivatives is used as for Ra and Rb and we
assume raα, raπ, rbβ , rbπ ≥ 0, raαα, raππ, rbββ , rbππ ≤ 0, and raαπ = rbβπ = 0
for all ownership structures. If negotiations break down joint revenues are
always less or equal to the case of successful negotiations:
Ra + Rb ≥ r
(A,B)
a + r
(A,B)
b , ∀α, β, π,A,B.
investing because the owner of the asset can use it without the investor’s consent. One
can extend the model to accommodate for human capital. In this case the investor can
threaten to stop cooperating and human capital would be lost.
31This assumption is valid for Adobe as firm A, the (free) PDF format as the platform,
and Adobe Acrobat Standard as the application (see the appendix in Niedermayer (2006)).
It is not an unreasonable approximation for MS Windows, as the price of the applications
sold by Microsoft are much higher than the price of the operating system.
32We also need the technical assumptions Rkl(0) ≥ 1 and Rkl(∞) < 1 for all k, l.
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3 Ownership Structure
In the following we will describe the results of stage 2 renegotiations for the
four ownership structures (1) acquisition of B by A, independent applica-
tion development for (2) a proprietary, (3) a standardized, and (4) an open
source platform. To simplify exposition, we will call them the acquisition,
the proprietary platform, the standardized platform, and the open source
platform cases. We will assume in all cases that if a surplus is generated by
an agreement, it will be divided according to the Nash bargaining solution
so that both A and B get half of the surplus. We will consider ownership
structures as though firms would choose between all four options at stage
1. However, as we will see later, if standardization or open sourcing makes
sense, A commits to it already at stage 0. Therefore, there are actually
only two possibilities to choose from at stage 1: acquisition or independent
application development with a predetermined licensing of the platform.
Acquisition of B by A. Because investment is in physical capital, it can
be fully expropriated by the asset owner. Therefore, B has no threat in the
bargaining process and revenues in case of a break down of negotiations are
rQa = Ra + Rb,
rQb = 0.
As A has all the bargaining power, she will extract the whole surplus. Ex
post profits of A and B are hence
V QA = Ra + Rb,
V QB = 0.
Proprietary Platform with Independent Application Developer.
In case negotiations break down, the same profit can be achieved with ap-
plication a. B, however, has lower revenues because of the “ex post squeeze”
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A engages in.
rPa = Ra,
rPb = (1 − κ)Rb, κ ∈ (0, 1).
The surplus created by an agreement, κRb, is split according to the Nash
bargaining solution, thus ex post profits are
V PA = Ra +
κ
2
Rb,
V PB =
(
1 −
κ
2
)
Rb.
Standardized Platform with Independent Application Developer
If negotiations break down, none of the firms can use the new API of the
platform. Revenues are
rSa = (1 − λ)Ra,
rSb = (1 − µ)Rb,
with λ, µ ∈ (0, 1).
The surplus is again split evenly and ex post profits are
V SA =
1
2
(Ra − ra + Rb − rb) + ra =
(
1 −
λ
2
)
Ra +
µ
2
Rb,
V SB =
1
2
(Ra − ra + Rb − rb) + rb =
λ
2
Ra +
(
1 −
µ
2
)
Rb.
Open Source Platform with Independent Application Developer
Here no one has a veto right, therefore, it is irrelevant whether an agreement
is reached and
rOa = Ra,
rOb = Rb.
Ex post profits are accordingly
V OA = Ra,
V OB = Rb.
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4 Investment Choice
We will first describe first-best levels of investment and then actual invest-
ment for the different ownership structures.
First-best. In first-best joint ex ante profits would be maximized
max
π,α,β
Ra + Rb − π − α − β.
The first-order conditions
Raπ(π
∗) + Rbπ(π
∗) = 1, (4.1)
Raα(α
∗) = 1,
Rbβ(β
∗) = 1,
are sufficient to determine the optimum because of the concavity of the
revenue functions.
In a second-best world, A and B invest such that their investments max-
imize ex ante profits
max
π,α
V
(A,B)
A − α − π,
max
β
V
(A,B)
B − β.
We get the following equilibrium conditions by setting the derivatives of the
ex post profits from Section 3 minus investment costs to zero, except for the
corner solution βQ in the acquisition case.
Acquisition
Raπ(π
Q) + Rbπ(π
Q) = 1, (4.2)
Raα(α
Q) = 1,
βQ = 0.
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Proprietary Platform
Raπ(π
P ) +
κ
2
Rbπ(π
P ) = 1, (4.3)
Raα(α
P ) = 1,
(
1 −
κ
2
)
Rbβ(β
P ) = 1.
Standardized Platform
(
1 −
λ
2
)
Raπ(π
S) +
µ
2
Rbπ(π
S) = 1, (4.4)
(
1 −
λ
2
)
Raα(α
S) = 1,
(
1 −
µ
2
)
Rbβ(β
S) = 1.
Open Source Platform
Raπ(π
O) = 1, (4.5)
Raα(α
O) = 1,
Rbβ(β
O) = 1,
4.1 Comparison of Investment Levels
In the following we will compare investment levels for the different own-
ership structures. For the sake of simplicity we only consider the cases
where investments have the same influence on both application revenues, i.e.
Raπ(α) = Rbπ(β). It is useful to consider first the case with λ < µ < κ < 1.
This is the situation where in case of no agreement firms still benefit from
improvements of the platform, the effect of no agreement is less severe than
in the case of an independent application developer, and the developer of the
platform loses less in case of a break down of negotiations. The advantage
of considering this situation is that any of the ownership structures can be
optimal depending on the importance of these different investments α, β,
and π. We will show later that for other cases some ownership structures
are dominated.
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Proposition 1 states that investments are (weakly) less than first-best
investments and gives a ranking of investment levels for different ownership
structures. Table 1 summarizes the results.
Proposition 1. Investments for different ownership structures compare as
follows:
i) π∗ = πQ ≥ πP ≥ πS ≥ πO,
ii) α∗ = αQ = αP = αO ≥ αS,
iii) β∗ = βO ≥ βS ≥ βP ≥ βQ.
Proof. The proof follows Hart (1995, p. 41). Note that inequalities are weak
to accommodate for the case that optimal investment is zero.
i) For any π we have for the left-hand-sides of Eqs. (4.1), (4.2), (4.3),
(4.4), and (4.5)
Raπ(π) + Rbπ(π) > Raπ(π) +
κ
2
Rbπ(π)
>
(
1 −
λ
2
)
Raπ(π) +
µ
2
Rbπ(π) > Raπ(π).
(4.6)
From (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), and (4.5) we also know that in all equations
the left-hand-sides are equal to 1 in optimum, therefore,
Raπ(π
∗) + Rbπ(π
∗) = Raπ(π
Q) + Rbπ(π
Q)
= Raπ(π
P ) +
κ
2
Rbπ(π
P ) =
(
1 −
λ
2
)
Raπ(π
S) +
µ
2
Rbπ(π
S) = Raπ(π
O)
(4.7)
We can use the fact that for concave functions f(·) and g(·) (f ′(x) > g′(x),∀x
and f ′(x1) = g
′(x2)) implies (x1 > x2). The proposition follows from (4.6)
and (4.7) and the concavity of Ra and Rb in π (Raππ < 0, Rbππ < 0).
ii) Analogously.
iii) Analogously. Additionally, βQ ≤ βP follows from βQ = 0 and β ≥
0.
Proposition 1 means that A’s incentive to invest in platform development
is highest if it has acquired B, lower if B is independent and the platform
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π α β
First-best (*) 1 1 1
Acquisition (Q) 1 1 4
Proprietary Platform (P) 2 1 3
Standardized Platform (S) 3 2 2
Open Source Platform (O) 4 1 1
Table 1: Ranking of investment levels for the platform and applications a
and b depending on ownership structure. A lower number means higher
investment.
proprietary, even lower for a standardized, and lowest for an open source
platform. B’s incentives to invest in his application are ranked in the oppo-
site order. In our setup, A’s investment in her own application is first-best
except for standardization, where A has to fear that some of the rents gen-
erated by the application might be expropriated by B. The result can be
interpreted as stating that the firms should be integrated if investment in
platform quality is the most important issue. If investment in B’s application
is most important, the platform should be open source. For intermediate
cases, A and B will agree on a proprietary or a standardized platform ex
ante.
This seems to fit some observations in the industry. If one considers
e.g. user friendliness as a task that has to be achieved by investments in
the platform then one would expect the following. A tightly integrated
platform such as Apple’s Mac OS should be user friendly, but have rather
low investments in third-party applications. A proprietary platform such as
Microsoft Windows would be somewhat less user friendly and have higher
investments by independent application developers. A standardized plat-
form such as Sun’s Java Platform and an open source platform such as the
Apache web server33 would be less user friendly, but would have relatively
larger investments in applications by independent developers.34
33A web server allows users to access web pages. However, for many web servers add-on
modules with further functionality are available such as database access.
34It has to be noted that investments in independent applications for Microsoft Windows
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4.2 Comparisons for Other Parameter Values
In the following we will keep the assumption Raπ = Rbπ and consider in-
vestment levels for different values of κ, λ, and µ. It is interesting that for
some of these cases, standardization is dominated.
µ < λ: (A blocking of changes in case of standardization does more
harm to A than to B.) Because of (1 − λ/2)Raπ + (µ/2)Rbπ < Raπ we have
πS < πO by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1. As the
order of the other investments remains the same, for a standardized platform
all investment levels are lower than for open source. Changing the order of
πS and πO in Table 1 reveals that standardization is dominated by other
ownership structures in this case and thus cannot be optimal no matter
which investment is more important.
µ ∈ (κ, κ + λ): (A blocking of changes in case of standardization causes
more harm to B than an ex post squeeze in case of a proprietary platform.
But the difference between the blocking harm for B and for A is less than B’s
harm in case of an ex post squeeze.) Because of (1−κ/2)Rbβ > (1−µ/2)Rbβ
investment β is less for a standardized than for a proprietary platform, while
the order of the other investments remains the same. Thus standardization
is dominated by a proprietary platform.
µ > κ + λ: (The difference between the blocking harm for B and for A is
larger than the ex post squeeze harm.) (1 + κ/2)Raπ < (1 − λ/2 + µ/2)Raπ
implies πS > πP . βP > βS from the previous paragraph still holds. This
means that the ordering of a standardized and a proprietary platform with
respect to both investments in the platform and the application b is reversed.
This is because for this parameter combination A’s bargaining power in case
of standardization is larger than in case of a proprietary platform.
are larger on an absolute scale. However, the Windows market is also much larger than
the markets of the two last mentioned platforms, so are Microsoft’s investments in the
platform and in its own applications. The large variety of complementary modules and
extensions for the Apache web server is notable given the size of the web server market.
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5 Asset Creation at Stage 0
So far, we have considered application b as already existent. Now we will
consider its creation. How the first version of a piece of software is cre-
ated is very important for its later success. We will assume that at stage 0
B makes the specific investment γ in the creation of application b. When
incorporating the specific investment in asset creation in the revenue func-
tion it becomes Rb(β, γ, π). Similar assumptions apply as before: Rbγ > 0,
Rbγγ < 0, Rbβγ = Rbπγ = 0. Ra is not affected by γ.
5.1 Expectations of Stage 1 Negotiations
To understand the decision about asset creation we need to look at acqui-
sition negotiations at stage 1. Let us assume that if there is no acquisition
at stage 1 either of the following three situations occurs: 1. A made no
commitment at stage 0, B is an independent developer for the proprietary
platform (P), 2. A standardized the platform at stage 0, B develops an ap-
plication for the standardized platform (S), 3. A open sourced the platform
at stage 0 (O). We will denote the no acquisition case with N, N being P, S,
or O depending on A’s previous commitment.
We will denote ex ante profits at stage 1 with
UkA := V
k
A − α
k − πk,
UkB := V
k
B − β
k,
with k ∈ {Q,N}. Assuming that negotiations are efficient, acquisition will
happen if UQA + U
Q
B > U
N
A + U
N
B . In case of an acquisition the generated
surplus is divided according to the Nash bargaining solution, A and B each
get (UQA + U
Q
B − U
N
A − U
N
B )/2, additionally to the profit they would get
without an acquisition. Therefore, A has the profit
UNA +
UQA + U
Q
B − U
N
A − U
N
B
2
=
UQA + U
N
A + U
Q
B − U
N
B
2
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and B’s firm is bought for the price
UNB +
UQA + U
Q
B − U
N
A − U
N
B
2
=
UQB + U
N
B + U
Q
A − U
N
A
2
.
5.2 Stage 0
At stage 0 A first commits to either nothing (N = P ), to a standardization
of her platform (N = S), or to open sourcing her platform (N = O). Next B
has to decide whether he wants to develop a first version of his application
and if he does want to, whether he wants to be independent or bargain
with A about being hired. If B does not enter the market he earns his
outside option ŨB ; further, A’s platform will be less successful as it has only
one application and A’s revenues will be ŨA. If B chooses to develop his
application, he makes a non-verifiable investment in physical capital γ. If
B is an employee, he will have no bargaining power at stage 1 whatsoever,
therefore, he will invest nothing. If B is independent and anticipates no
acquisition at stage 1, he will invest such that UNB − γ is maximized. His
investment is hence given implicitly by UNBγ = 1. If he expects to be acquired
at stage 1, he invests such that (UQB + U
N
B + U
Q
A −U
N
A )/2− γ is maximized.
It can be shown that if Rbβγ = 0 the optimal investment level is the same
as when no acquisition is expected and γ is hence given again implicitly by
UNBγ = 1.
35 If γ and β were complements (i.e. Rbβγ > 0), γ would be lower
if B expects an acquisition.
Two observations can be made. First, as mentioned in Hart (1995),
if the asset is owned by someone else than the creator of the asset, there
would be too little effort invested in asset creation because of the hold-up at
completion. Second, if N is chosen such that B as an independent firm has a
better bargaining position at stage 1, B will invest more in the asset creation
no matter whether there will be an acquisition at stage 1 or not.36 This
35E.g. for N = P the derivative of (UQB + U
N
B + U
Q
A − U
N
A )/2 with respect to γ is
∂[(0 + (1 − κ/2)Rb + Rb − (κ/2)Rb)/2]/∂γ which is equal to U
P
Bγ .
36And if we modify the model such that UA increases in γ, this can be beneficial for A
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shows us that if standardization or open sourcing (two measures increasing
B’s bargaining position at stage 1) makes sense at stage 1, it makes even
more sense at stage 0, as it will increase B’s incentives for an investment in
asset creation.
As for the different investment levels at the asset creation stage, the
same applies as for β: γ∗ = γO ≥ γS ≥ γP ≥ γQ, with the proof being
completely analogous. Given the assumption Rbβγ = 0, investments are the
same if an acquisition is expected at stage 1: γNQ = γN , N ∈ {P, S,O}.
6 Discussion
We sum up the different scenarios which are possible given the results de-
scribed above.
B as employee: A hires B to develop application b at stage 0. B makes
no non-verifiable investments in the development of the first version
at stage 0 (γ = 0) and in the further development of the application
at stage 1 (β = 0). A makes profits UQA (π = π
Q, α = αQ, β = 0, γ = 0)
and pays B his outside option at stage 0 in order to hire him. If it is
not attractive for B to enter on his own (UPB − γ
P < ŨB) the outside
option is ŨB .
B acquired at stage 1: B develops a first version of his application and
is then acquired by A. B starts developing his application with the
intention of being acquired later. Depending on the licensing of the
platform (proprietary, standardized, or open source) he anticipates his
bargaining position at acquisition and chooses his investment in the
first version accordingly (γNQ, N ∈ {P, S,O}). After being acquired,
B invests nothing in the further development of the application (β =
0). A makes profits UQA (π = π
Q, α = αQ, β = 0, γ = γNQ) and pays
even if there is no acquisition at stage 1.
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(UQB + U
N
B + U
Q
A −U
N
A )/2 from these for the acquisition of B at stage
1. The three possible licensing schemes for the platform are:
Proprietary. A does not make any commitments. B knows that the
acquisition price will be lower and invests little (γPQ) in asset
creation.
Standardized. If higher investment in asset creation is needed, A
commits to standardize her platform, giving B hence a better
bargaining position and higher investment incentives. Standard-
ization may further serve to make entry more attractive for B if
B’s profits resulting from an application for a proprietary plat-
form are not sufficient.
Open Source. If γ should be increased further or B’s entry should
be encouraged more, A commits to open source.
B stays independent: B creates his application as an independent devel-
oper and stays independent at stage 1. B anticipates his bargaining
position at stage 2 already at stage 0 and makes his investment in the
first γN and the newer βN version of his application according to the li-
censing of the platform (N ∈ {P, S,O}). Investment β is clearly higher
than in case of an acquisition. A’s profits are UNA (π = π
N , α = αN )
and B’s are UNB (π = π
N , β = βN , γ = γN ). As γ has little impact on
A’s profits in case of standardization and no impact in case of open
source, one would expect A not to be willing to move from proprietary
licensing if she does not intend to acquire B at stage 1. However, this
is not the case: B might not be willing to enter the market if he can
only achieve the low profits that development for a proprietary plat-
form offers. Left with only one application running on it, A’s platform
will not be as successful, A earning thus only ŨA. Therefore, all of the
following three licensing schemes for the platform are possible.
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Proprietary. A has high, B has low profits. If B’s profits are too low
(UPB − γ
P < ŨB) he will opt for his outside option.
Standardized. A’s profits are lowered, B’s increased. If standardiza-
tion lets B’s entry become profitable (UPB − γ
P < ŨB < U
S
B − γ
S)
and entry is beneficial to A, A will standardize. This result only
holds if side payments to independent firms in exchange for mar-
ket entry are not feasible. Otherwise A will pay B just enough to
be indifferent between entry and non-entry.
Open Source. If not even standardization is sufficient to induce en-
try, open sourcing may be (if USB − γ
S < ŨB < U
O
B − γ
O). Again,
A would prefer side payments if possible.
Single Application Platform. It can occur that convincing B to enter
would be so costly for A that he prefers non-entry. In this case A’s
platform is less successful and A only earns ŨA, B earns his outside
option ŨB. Note that entry may not occur in second-best even if it is
optimal in first-best. This is the case if U∗A + U
∗
B − γ
∗ > ŨA + ŨB >
UXA + U
X
B − γ
X , X being any of the licensing/ownership structures
mentioned above.
7 Conclusions
We have considered a model with a developer A whose firm owns both a
platform and an application running on the platform. It would be important
for the success of the platform if another developer B’s firm created a further
application for it. However, B may hesitate to do so, as the rents generated
might be expropriated by A. If B enters, he may make suboptimal specific
investments both when creating and when developing further his application
because of the hold-up problem.
Depending on the importance of firms’ specific investments at different
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stages, one of several possible outcomes will occur. A may hire B to create
the application; B may stay independent at asset creation and be acquired
by A later on; or B may stay independent at all stages. In both cases of B’s
independence, three licensing schemes can be chosen by A for her platform:
proprietary, standardized, or open source. Standardization increases B’s
bargaining position, open sourcing increases it even further. The higher
B’s bargaining power, the more willing he is to enter and the more specific
investments he will make in case of entry. At the same time, this reduces
A’s share of overall profits and investment incentives. As a further effect,
A’s profits may be reduced so far that she is not willing to make concessions
to induce B’s entry. In this case B will stay out of the market and A’s
application will be the only one to run on her platform. This can happen
even if entry were optimal in first-best.
Facing the abovementioned alternatives, firms choose the ownership struc-
ture that minimizes inefficiency.
References
Bessen, J. E. (2005): “Open Source Software: Free Provision Of Complex
Public Goods,” SSRN eLibrary.
Boudreau, K. (2006): “How Open Should an Open System Be?: Essays on
Mobile Computing,” Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Sloan School of Management.
Economides, N. (1996): “Network externalities, complementarities, and
invitations to enter,” European Journal of Political Economy, 12(2), 211–
233.
Economides, N., and E. Katsamakas (2006): “Linux vs. Windows: A
Comparison of Application and Platform Innovations Incentives for Open
Source and Proprietary Software Platforms,” in The Economics of Open
Source Software Development: Analyzing Motivation, Organization, In-
novation and Competitions in the Open Source Software Revolution, ed.
by J. Bitzer, and P. Schröder. Elsevier.
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